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Eureka County v. Seventy Jud. Dist. Ct., 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 37 (May 17, 2018)1 
PROPERTY LAW: DUE PROCESS OF WATER RIGHTS 
Summary 
The court held that junior water rights holders are entitled to notice of and an 
opportunity to participate in the district court's consideration of a curtailment request.            
Facts and Procedural History 
Sadler Ranch purchased its real property and water rights in Diamond Valley in 
September 2011. Sadler Ranch claims to be a pre-statutory, vested, senior water rights holder 
in Diamond Valley. In 2014, Sadler Ranch petitioned the State Engineer for replacement water 
to offset significant loss from its springs. Dissatisfied with their replacement water award, 
Sadler Ranch petitioned the district court in April 2015 to order the State Engineer to initiate 
curtailment proceedings in Diamond Valley. In August 2015, the State Engineer officially 
designated Diamond Valley as a critical management area. Determining that this designation 
would not help its water dispute, Sadler Ranch then filed an amended petition for curtailment. 
The district court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the State Engineer's 
motion to dismiss, finding that the State Engineer's failure to order curtailment was an abuse 
of his discretion. The same day, the district court entered an alternative writ of mandamus 
directing the State Engineer to begin curtailment proceedings or show cause why he had not 
done so. 
In August 2016, the State Engineer filed a motion arguing that Sadler Ranch must 
provide notice to all Diamond Valley appropriators who may be affected by the district court's 
decision at an upcoming show cause hearing. In October 2016, the district court denied the 
State Engineer's motion reasoning that even if it ordered curtailment at the upcoming show 
cause hearing, specifics of the curtailment could not be decided until a future proceeding and 
due process was not required until that future proceeding. The district court also reasoned that 
any potential unnotified parties were already adequately represented by the diverse interests 
of the dozens of interveners. 
Eureka County subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration and was joined by the 
State Engineer. The district court denied Eureka County's motion to reconsider. In February 
2017, Eureka County filed the instant writ petition. 
Discussion 
The writ petition should be entertained 
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The Court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition2 which 
are available to compel the performance of an act which the law requires as a duty resulting 
from an office, or to control a manifest abuse or an arbitrary or capricious exercise of 
discretion.3 Because a writ petition seeks an extraordinary remedy, its consideration is 
discretionary4 and only available where there is no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law."5 Although the Court has previously held that appeals generally 
constitute an adequate and speedy remedy precluding writ relief, they have also exercised 
their discretion to intervene in cases of urgency or strong necessity, or when an important 
issue of law needs clarification.6 The Court, in this case, chose to entertain the writ petition 
due to the district court’s apparent arbitrary and capricious exercise its discretion in denying 
the State Engineer's motion.  
The parties did not dispute that at some point in the proceedings due process would 
attach, but instead disputed when due process must be provided. Here, the Court held that 
judicial economy and the existence of other over appropriated basins in the state favored 
consideration of the writ in order to answer the due process question now rather than on appeal 
after future hearings.  
Due process requires notice be given to all junior water rights holders 
Constitutional challenges are reviewed de novo, including due process challenges.7 
The Nevada Constitution protects against the deprivation of property without due process of 
law,8 and procedural due process requires that parties receive notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.9 In Nevada, water rights are regarded and protected as real property.10  
In the lower court proceedings all parties agreed that water rights are property rights 
protected by due process, but disagreed on when due process rights attach and when notice 
must be given. The district court characterized the show cause hearing as a step to determine 
whether future proceedings are required. However, language in the resulting order showed 
that a possible outcome of the hearing was a judicial determination that may force curtailment. 
Any junior water rights holders notified after that decision would only be able to argue that 
the curtailment cutoff date should be below their priority level, and would not be able to argue 
for alternate solutions. 
                                               
2  Mountain View Hosp., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. 180, 184, 273 P.3d 861, 864 (2012); see 
NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 4. 
3  Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906, 907- 08 (2008). 
4  Cheung v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 867, 869, 124 P.3d 550, 552 (2005). 
5  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 34.170 (2017); Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 
179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008).  
6  Nev. Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 132 Nev., Adv. Op. 77, 383 P.3d 246, 248 (2016) 
(quoting Cote H., 124 Nev. at 39, 175 P.3d at 907-08). 
7  Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007). 
8  NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8(5). 
9  Callie, 123 Nev. at 183, 160 P.3d at 879. 
10  Application of Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, 21-22, 202 P.2d 535, 537 (1949). 
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Notice must be given at an appropriate stage in the proceedings to give parties 
meaningful input in the adjudication of their rights.11 Thus, junior water rights holders must 
be notified before the curtailment decision is made, even if the specific details are to be 
decided in a future proceeding. Further, real property rights, including water rights, are unique 
forms of property and those with an ownership interest cannot be adequately represented by 
others.12  
The Court determined that the district court's reliance on Desert Valley was misplaced 
because that case dealt with providing notice of an appeal as required by statute, rather than 
notice required by due process prior to the deprivation of a property right.13 Here, the district 
court's exercise of its discretion to deny the junior water rights holders their due process rights 
to notice and the opportunity to be heard at the upcoming show cause hearing was arbitrary 
and capricious. 
Finally, although Sadler Ranch's argues that notice will further delay proceedings, 
impairing their own water rights without due process, Sadler Ranch acknowledged that at 
some point the court will require all Diamond Valley water rights holders to be given notice. 
The Court held that it is not unduly burdensome to give notice now rather than at some future 
time. 
Conclusion 
 Because a show cause hearing may result in a court order to begin curtailment 
proceedings, resulting in possible deprivation of property rights, due process requires junior 
water rights holders in Diamond Valley to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
the district court conducts the hearing. Accordingly, the court directed the clerk of the court to 
issue a writ of mandamus vacating the district court's order denying the State Engineer's motion 
for Sadler Ranch to provide notice to all affected appropriators and directed the district court 
to enter an order requiring that notice be provided to all junior water rights holders prior to any 
show cause hearing. 
                                               
11  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). 
12  See Dixon v. Thatcher, 103 Nev. 414, 416, 742 P.2d 1029, 1030 (1987). 
13  Desert Valley Water Co. v. State, 104 Nev. 718, 766 P.2d 886 (1988). 
